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Summary 17 
Imagining the future is a powerful tool for making plans and solving problems. It is thought to 18 
rely on the episodic system which also underpins remembering a specific past event [1-3]. 19 
However, the emergence of episodic future thinking over development and evolution is debated 20 
[4-9]. One key source of positive evidence in pre-schoolers and animals is the ‘Spoon Test’ or 21 
Item Choice Test [4, 10], in which participants encounter a problem in one context, and then a 22 
choice of items in another context, one of which is the solution to the problem. The majority of 23 
studies report that most children choose the right item by the age of 4 [10-15, cf 16]. Apes and 24 
corvids have also been shown to pass versions of the test [17-19]. However, it has been 25 
suggested that a simpler mechanism could be driving choice: the participant simply chooses the 26 
item that has been assigned salience or value, without necessarily imagining the future event [16, 27 
20-23]. We developed a new test in which two of the items offered to children were associated 28 
with positive outcomes, but only one was still useful. We found that older children (5-, 6- and 7-29 
year-olds) chose the correct item at above chance levels, but younger children (3- and 4-year-30 
olds) did not. In further tests 4-year-olds showed an intact memory for the encoding event. We 31 
conclude that positive association substantially impacts performance on Item Choice Tests in 4-32 
year-olds, and that future planning may have a more protracted developmental trajectory than 33 
episodic memory. 34 
 35 
Results and Discussion  36 
 37 
Experiment 1 38 
We developed a new Item Choice Test (ICT) designed to rule out explanations for success based 39 
on one of the items acquiring higher value through past experience. We tested eleven 3-year-olds 40 
(M = 41 months, range 36 to 47 months); forty-four 4-year-olds (M = 55 months, range 48 to 59 41 
months); sixty-one 5-year-olds (M = 66 months, range 60 to 71 months); forty-nine 6-year-olds 42 
(M = 77 months, range 72 to 83 months); and forty-seven 7-year-olds (M = 89 months, range 85 43 
to 95 months) (Table 1).  Each child was taught how to use two visually distinct boxes, which 44 
dispensed stickers when the participant placed the correct token into the machine.  After learning 45 
this, children were told that one box would remain in place and they would return to it, and while 46 
the other box was being put away, they were told that it would no longer be available (the order 47 
in which these two actions was performed was counterbalanced across participants). They went 48 
to another room to complete a vocabulary test and they were then offered 3 tokens to choose 49 
between.  These included the token from the box which was accessible to them (correct), the 50 
token which operated the unavailable box (associate distractor), and a third token that they had 51 
never seen before (novel distractor). To pass, the child had to use their memory of the encoding 52 
event (which box was left on the table) to plan for the future. If children simply chose objects 53 
that had gained incentive value by previously being paired with a reward, we would expect them 54 
to choose at random between previously useful tokens. This design was based on the majority of 55 
the other ICTs conducted with children, with the delay between encoding and choice. It should 56 
be noted that in previous ICTs with apes and corvids subject first choose and then face a delay 57 
and a need to transport the selected item. We chose the former design because we wanted to 58 
isolate the impact of including the additional distractor and draw close comparisons with the 59 
previous work with children.  60 
 61 
Performance in the item choice phase improved across age categories (Table 1, Figure 1), with 62 
younger children not choosing significantly better than chance according to a binomial test, 63 
where chance likelihood to take the correct token is 1/3 (3-year olds, observed =1/11, p=0.988; 64 
4-year olds, observed=14/44, p=0.639) and older children choosing the correct token 65 
significantly above chance levels (5-year-olds, observed =39/61, p<0.001, 6-year-olds observed 66 
= 34/49 p<0.001, and 7-year-olds, observed = 36/47, p = <0.001). Three-year-olds showed a high 67 
initial dropout rate and after 11 were tested we stopped recruiting them. We did not analyse their 68 
data further owing to the small sample size. 69 
 70 
To evaluate episodic memory for the encoding event, we asked the children a memory question 71 
after they had chosen their token, namely whether or not they could remember the colour of the 72 
box on the table. Performance improved with age (Table 1). As this was an open-ended question 73 
it is feasible that children could have responded with any colour, or that they did not know. 74 
However, given that children only had experience of two box colours performance was assessed 75 
relative to a chance level of 50%: 5-, 6- and 7-year-olds (all ps <0.001) but not 4-year-olds (p= 76 
0.639) responded significantly above chance according to a binomial test (Table 1). Atance & 77 
Sommerville [12] found that memory for the encoding event was an important factor in 78 
determining whether or not children succeeded on a test battery of ICTs, such that when they 79 
controlled for memory performance, there was no longer an effect of age on item choice. This 80 
could suggest a link between memory and planning in development, though Atance & 81 
Sommerville stressed that a positive association is difficult to interpret as memory of the 82 
specifics of the to-be-planned for event is a prerequisite for success, regardless of the underlying 83 
cognitive mechanisms. Performance on the memory question for 5-7-year-olds was near perfect 84 
(only 5 out of 157 children were incorrect) and so examining a relationship between item choice 85 
and memory performance was not meaningful, though it is notable that in spite of this good 86 
memory performance, 48 children chose the wrong token. The performance of 4-year-olds was 87 
much more variable, with 12 of the 25 children who got the memory question correct choosing 88 
the right item, compared to only 2 of the 19 children that got the memory question wrong. This 89 
association between the two measures was significant (Fisher’s Exact Test p=0.0103). However, 90 
considering only the 25 4-year-olds that got the memory question right, four-year-olds still 91 
performed at chance level on the choice phase (binomial test p=0.092). Whether or not there is 92 
an association between memory performance and item choice in 4-year-olds remains uncertain 93 
from these results, not least because the memory question is asked after token choice, which 94 
might be biasing responses.  This issue is examined in more detail in Experiment 3. 95 
 96 
We included a further performance measure inspired by the comparative literature in which 97 
subjects are evaluated on their propensity to spontaneously transport a necessary tool to the point 98 
of use [17]. Children needed to be encouraged to come back to the first context after choosing 99 
their token. We therefore did not evaluate whether or not they would spontaneously transport the 100 
token next door as in the case of the animal work, but rather we gave children a 30s period to use 101 
their chosen token on the box before prompting them to do so: when the child entered the room 102 
with the box the experimenter made eye contact with the child and gave an encouraging nod 103 
before busying herself with papers. Interestingly, levels of spontaneous use were lower than item 104 
choice, and increased with age (Table 1). There was a significant relationship between token 105 
choice and spontaneous use for 4, 5, 6, and 7-year-olds (FET, all p<.01), with those that chose 106 
the correct token being more likely to use it spontaneously (Figure 2). This could indicate that 107 
spontaneous use is a fruitful measure for future work on planning in children, though these 108 
preliminary results should be interpreted with caution. The children could see the box when this 109 
measure was taken, which could lead to higher levels of use by children with the right token. A 110 
further caveat is that negative results on this measure could have several causes, including a need 111 
for more explicit permission to approach the box. 112 
 113 
Finally, children were given a knowledge probe: the 3 tokens from the choice phase were placed 114 
in front of the box for them to choose between to get a final sticker. Children performed well 115 
above chance levels on this knowledge probe from the age of 4, indicating that they remembered 116 
the details of the training (Table 1). 117 
 118 
Experiment 2 119 
The chance-level item choice performance of 4-year-olds in Experiment 1, in contrast to their 120 
good performance on previous ICTs, could reflect a reliance on assigning associative value to 121 
useful objects and a failure to imagine the specific configuration that they could expect in the 122 
future. However, their choices were not split between the two previously useful tokens, but 123 
rather they chose at chance between the three options, making this null result difficult to 124 
interpret. It would be instructive to know how they would perform in this paradigm if there was 125 
only one option with any previous utility, making it more similar to previous ICTs. In 126 
Experiment 2 we therefore gave 4-year-olds the same training as in Experiment 1 (namely to 127 
operate the 2 different boxes with 2 different tokens), but critically, at the time of choice they 128 
were presented with only one of these previously useful tokens (the correct token), alongside a 129 
token from the bank of 7 distractors used during training that did not operate either box (the 130 
familiar distractor), and a novel token. We tested a further 20 4-year-olds (Table 1).  If 131 
associative strength influences choice, approximately two thirds of children should choose the 132 
correct token in Experiment 2, corresponding to the proportion that chose one of the two 133 
previously useful tokens in Experiment 1. However, if the chance performance of four-year-olds 134 
was due to the complexity of the training phase leading them to become confused or to forget the 135 
critical information needed to plan, they should continue to choose at chance. 136 
 137 
We found that children performed significantly above chance level, in contrast to their 138 
performance in Experiment 1 (Table 1, Figure 1, binomial, test prop = .33, observed =14/20, 139 
p<.001). This success rate is comparable to that previously seen in the literature of ICTs in 4-140 
year-olds [10-15, cf 16]. This difference in performance depending only on the inclusion 141 
(Experiment 1) or not (Experiment 2) of the associate distractor at the time of choice indicates 142 
that, as hypothesised, associative memory for previously assigned value or salience of an object 143 
is a critical factor for success in this kind of task. When associative memory was sufficient for 144 
success, four-year-olds passed, when it was not, they did not. 145 
 146 
Interestingly, children answered the memory question more accurately in this variation of the 147 
experiment. All 20 four-year-olds remembered the colour of the box that would be accessible in 148 
the final part of the test, whereas only 57% of four-year-olds remembered the colour of the box 149 
in Experiment 1.  As in the Atance & Sommerville test battery [12], in Experiment 1 there was a 150 
trend for memory performance to predict item choice in four-year-olds, which could be 151 
interpreted as supporting the notion that memory and planning develop in parallel in childhood: 152 
if they remember the encoding event well, they can plan for the next event, but when they do not, 153 
they can’t. But why would children have remembered the encoding event better in Experiment 2 154 
than in Experiment 1, when everything about the training situation was the same? As in the 155 
Atance & Sommerville test battery children were always asked about their memory for the 156 
identity of the task after they had chosen their item.  The contrasting results from Experiments 1 157 
and 2 could indicate that children’s responses to memory questions are being influenced by their 158 
item choice. In Experiment 1, choosing the associate distractor could have cued the alternative 159 
box, and indeed most of the children who chose the associate distractor answered the memory 160 
question incorrectly (Figure 3). In Experiment 2 when there was no associate distractor, 161 
children’s performance on the memory question was very good, though by extension of the 162 
above argument, their performance could have been assisted by choosing the token associated 163 
not only with a positive outcome but also the correct box.  It remains unclear whether or not 164 
children would be able to remember the colour of the box on the table next door if they had no 165 
cue from the tokens. The status of 4-year-olds ability to remember the encoding event is 166 
important in interpreting our results, because if, when asked about it first, 4-year-olds cannot 167 
remember which box is accessible following the encoding event, it would be rational for them to 168 
split their choices between the 2 previously useful tokens, whereas if they can remember the 169 
identity of the box, the reason for them not choosing the right item would be more complicated. 170 
In Experiment 3 we therefore conducted a third variation in which the memory question about 171 
box colour was asked prior to item choice.   172 
 173 
Experiment 3 174 
A further 20 four-year-olds were tested in the same way as Experiment 1, with the exception that 175 
after completing the vocabulary test they were first asked the memory question about which box 176 
was on the table.  Our chief focus in this experiment was to examine memory performance, but 177 
we nevertheless gave the children the choice between the correct token, the associate distractor 178 
and a novel distractor, to see how their choice would be affected by first answering the memory 179 
question. However, it should be noted that because children were first prompted to remember the 180 
identity of box on the table before item choice, they did not need to imagine what they would 181 
likely encounter next, so in this case the Item Choice measure would not be considered a test of 182 
future thinking. 183 
 184 
We found that children performed significantly above chance level on the memory question 185 
when it was asked prior to item choice: 95% of them knew which box was available to them 186 
(binomial, observed = 19/20, p<0.001).   Interestingly, despite having just provided this 187 
information, only 50% of children went on to pass the item choice measure (Table 1, Figure 1), 188 
suggesting that an intact memory is not sufficient for successful choice. A binomial test revealed 189 
that this performance was not statistically different from chance, though there was a trend for 190 
them to perform well, (binomial, test prop = .33, observed = 10/20, p = 0.092). Performance was 191 
slightly higher than in Experiment 1, but not as high as in Experiment 2, where we were able to 192 
detect above chance levels of responding with the same sample size. Closer examination of 193 
performance of 4-year-olds in Experiment 1 (memory question after choice) and Experiment 3 194 
(memory question before choice) reveals that the principle difference between these groups 195 
concerns children that chose the wrong token (Figure 3). In Experiment 1, the majority of the 196 
children that chose the associate distractor responded incorrectly to the memory question with 197 
the box that was associated with that token. However, in Experiment 3 almost all of children 198 
(including those that went on to choose the wrong token) answered the memory question 199 
correctly. This result is consistent with other findings that suggest episodic memory at age four is 200 
fragile and can be disrupted by intervening semantic or associative information if it is in conflict 201 
with the past reality [24, 25]. Our suggestion is therefore that children could in principle have 202 
remembered the identity of the box in Experiment 1 before they chose the token – however, 203 
whether they in actual fact remembered correctly and then nevertheless chose at chance (which 204 
in turn corrupted their answer to the memory question), or simply failed to try to remember the 205 
identity of the box at all, is a question for future work. 206 
 207 
Our results suggest that positive association can support performance on ICTs, which could lead 208 
to false positives if the test is being used as a measure of planning. When only one item had 209 
associative value, a significant number of four-year-olds chose that correct item, but when two of 210 
the items had associative value but only one had future utility, four-year-olds chose randomly. 211 
By five-years of age, children’s performance was above chance on this more stringent test.  212 
Future work on planning should ensure that explanations based on associative strength or cuing 213 
are carefully controlled for. Our results have clear implications for work on the evolution of 214 
future planning, because tasks that have been conducted to date in animals [17-19] do not fully 215 
control for success by positive association: subjects could have succeeded without imagining the 216 
future, but instead by selecting the object with associative value, or something similar to it [7, 8, 217 
21, 26]. Our test, which does not involve verbal framing, or tool-use, would be suitable for 218 
adoption with a wide range of animal species. Nevertheless it should be noted that the 219 
comparative versions of the ICT impose challenges that the developmental versions do not [27], 220 
such as the need to retain and transport the selected tool, which our preliminary results from the 221 
spontaneous use measure suggest may be challenging for young children.  In previous work with 222 
children, some studies have attempted to make success by association less likely by training 223 
children with a tool that has a different shape to the one they will need to solve the next problem 224 
(e.g. a square tool at training, and a triangle needed in the future [13, 14]), or by only presenting 225 
the problem during encoding, without describing the solution [12]. However, it remains possible 226 
that at test, children recognise the value of the target based on their past exposure to the problem 227 
and select it on that basis (for example, if they identified the object that they would need during 228 
encoding, and then recognised it at test as something they wanted), rather than by imagining the 229 
future event in which it will be useful. The current results substantiate the plausibility of lean 230 
alternatives over the rich interpretations, and so highlight the need for cautious analyses.  From a 231 
wider theoretical perspective, our findings could have implications for theories that see episodic 232 
memory and episodic future thinking as being part of a single, recently evolved system [6, 28]. 233 
Our results are in line with other recent findings suggesting that future planning may emerge 234 
later than episodic memory over human development [29-32]. Previous evidence for episodic 235 
future planning in four-year-olds has been mixed, with much of the positive evidence coming 236 
from ICTs. In other future-oriented tasks, as in this study, children do not show competence until 237 
the age of five or later [25, 29-32]. While this difference in the age of emergence does not 238 
preclude a common cognitive mechanism underpinning both episodic future thinking episodic 239 
memory, it may indicate that there are significant unique components to planning, such as 240 
imagination, independent goal-setting, temporal representation, and self-control [33].   241 
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Figure Legends 342 
 343 
Figure 1: Item choice distribution in Experiment 1 across age categories, and in 344 
Experiments 2 and 3. Black = correct; Grey = associate; Striped = familiar; White = novel. 345 
Asterisks indicate % correct is higher than chance (binomial test, p < .05). 346 
 347 
Figure 2: Performance on the memory, knowledge probe and spontaneous use measures of 348 
Experiment 1 for children that chose the correct or an incorrect token. White = 4-year-olds; 349 
Light grey = 5-year-olds; Dark grey = 6-year-olds; Black = 7-year-olds. 350 
 351 
Figure 3: Performance on the memory question depending on whether it was asked before 352 
or after item choice. Percentage of individuals for each choice category who performed 353 
correctly on the memory question (correctly reported the colour of the box on the table) when the 354 
memory question was asked after (Experiment 1, white bars) or prior to (Experiment 3, black 355 
bars) item choice.  356 
 357 
 358 
 359 
Table 1: The percentage of children in each age category who responded correctly in the item 360 
choice, memory question, knowledge probe, and spontaneous use phases of Experiments 1, 2 and 361 
3. In Experiments 1 and 3 there was a choice between the correct, associate and novel tokens, in 362 
Experiment 2 the choice was between correct, familiar and novel tokens. In Experiment 3 the 363 
memory question was asked before item choice, in Experiments 1 and 2 item choice came first. 364 
Asterisks indicate performance higher than chance (binomial test, p < .05). 365 
 366 
 367 
 Age 
Group 
n 
(males) 
Mean age 
in months 
(StD) 
Item 
Choice 
(% correct) 
Memory 
Question  
(% correct) 
Knowledge 
Probe  
(% correct) 
Spontaneous 
Use (%) 
Experiment 1 
3 11 (8) 41 (4.5) 9 18 55 9 
4 44 (22) 55 (3.6) 32 57 80* 20 
5 61 (30) 66 (3.6) 64* 95* 95* 31 
6 49 (23) 77 (3.7) 69* 100* 94* 37 
7 47 (23) 89 (3.3) 77* 96* 96* 70 
Experiment 2 
No Associate 
4 20 (11) 53 (3.7) 70* 100* 95* 15 
Experiment 3 
Memory 
Question 1st 
4 20 (9) 54 (3.4) 50 95* 90* 25 
 368 
 369 
STAR Methods 370 
 371 
CONTACT FOR REAGENT AND RESOURCE SHARING 372 
 373 
“Further information and requests for resources and reagents should be directed to and will be 374 
fulfilled by the Lead Contact, Dr. Amanda Seed ams18@st-andrews.ac.uk 375 
 376 
EXPERIMENTAL MODEL AND SUBJECT DETAILS 377 
 378 
The experimental group for Experiment 1 consisted of 220 children. Eight children did not reach 379 
criterion (performing six correct activations in a row on the boxes), and were therefore excluded 380 
from the experimental analysis (ages in years, months: 3,1 | 3,2 | 3,7 | 3,7 | 3.9 | 4,7 | 6,1 | 6,3), 381 
leaving 212 children in the analysis (see Table 1 for age and gender information). While 3-year-382 
olds were initially included in the experimental group, most members of this age group could not 383 
complete the training phase so we stopped recruiting them.  Children were recruited at 384 
Edinburgh Zoo. In Experiments 2 and 3 we tested a total of 40 4-year-olds (see Table 1 for age 385 
and gender information).  No children were dropped from the study.  Children were recruited 386 
from the Edinburgh Zoo and Dundee Science Centre.  Visitors were approached and informed 387 
about the study prior to being asked to join and written consent was required from parents prior 388 
to participation. The study had ethical approval from the University of St Andrews ethics 389 
committee. 390 
METHOD DETAILS 391 
 392 
Materials and Apparatus 393 
Participants were invited into a sectioned and covered area within the visitor attraction 394 
containing a table and two chairs.  This area was placed inside of a walled tent so that it was 395 
visually isolated from another set of table and chairs, where the vocabulary test and item choice 396 
took place (see Figure S1).  The puzzle boxes, measuring approximately 40cm x 25cm x25cm, 397 
contained a revolving dispenser that could be operated discretely by the experimenter by remote 398 
control.  These rectangular boxes were visually distinct, in both colour (red vs. blue) and shape 399 
(sharp vs. rounded edges, respectively) (Figure S2a). Tokens measured approximately two inches 400 
in diameter and were distinct in both shape and colour (Figure S2b).  There were ten possible 401 
tokens, two of which were assigned as the operational token for one of the boxes and one of 402 
which was excluded from the training phase so that it was novel at the time of item choice. Their 403 
roles were fully counterbalanced across participants.   404 
 405 
Procedure 406 
Children were invited to sit at the table, at which point the experimenter placed one of two 407 
puzzle boxes in front of the child. The experimenter first inserted a token is into the opening of 408 
the puzzle box and dispensed a sticker reward.  An envelope was provided to each child to so 409 
that they could gather their rewards.  Participants were then given the same token and allowed to 410 
copy the experimenter in order to obtain another sticker.  After this, three tokens were placed in 411 
front of the children, one of which was the correct token to operate the box.  The functional 412 
tokens were fully counterbalanced across participants.  The other tokens were chosen at random 413 
from a stock of seven (excluding two functional tokens and one kept back as the final novel 414 
token during the item choice phase).  The experimenter informed the child to choose one and 415 
“try for another sticker”.  Once the participant chose, the remaining tokens were removed from 416 
the table as the child attempted to activate the box.  This phase ended once children successfully 417 
activated the box a total of three times (did not have to be consecutive).  The same procedure 418 
was then repeated on the other box.  After a total of three successful activations on this box 419 
(again non-consecutive), the next phase of training began.  At this point the participant had to 420 
consecutively choose the right token three times on the first box. After three consecutive 421 
activations the boxes were switched over. The same rule applied to the next box. This continued 422 
until children had activated each box three times without a mistake, for a total of six correct 423 
choices in a row.  We switched between the boxes up to six times before ending the training 424 
phase regardless of whether or not the participant had reached criterion.  At this point, if criterion 425 
had been reached, it was determined that the child knew which token was required for each box. 426 
Choosing six correct tokens in a row was considered reaching criterion.  4 3-year-olds, 2 4-year-427 
olds, 1 5-year-old and 1 6-year-old did not reach criterion. 428 
 429 
Children were then instructed that they should leave their stickers on the table, because they 430 
would return to get them later.  The experimenter then either drew the attention of the child to 431 
the box that was being removed from use: stating that they “can’t play with that one anymore”, 432 
or to the other: which, they were told, would “stay here on the table and you can play with it 433 
before you leave”.  At that point they would show them the other box, meaning that attention 434 
was either drawn last to the box that they could not play with or the one remaining on the table.  435 
The colour of the box left on the table was counterbalanced across participants, in addition to the 436 
box that they looked at last.  This was done to ensure that participants did not always last look at 437 
the box that they could return to.  We chose to do this in order to avoid either primacy or recency 438 
effects, whereby the first or last thing seen is the first to be recalled.  439 
 440 
The experimenter then escorted the child into another area, where they performed the BPVS-III.  441 
In keeping with the standards of this diagnostic test, this portion of the experiment took 442 
approximately seven minutes.  The table with the boxes was not visually accessible to the 443 
participants at this time.  At the end of the test, children were offered the choice between one of 444 
three tokens.  One token was the useful token for the box that would still be accessible to them.  445 
This was considered to be the correct choice.  Another token was the one that could be used to 446 
activate the box that they could no longer use (the associate distractor).  The final token was a 447 
novel token that they had never seen before or used in the training phase (the novel distractor). 448 
Children were told that they were “going to go back to get their stickers” and that they could 449 
“pick one of these to take with them.”  They were all then asked the memory question – ‘Do you 450 
remember which colour box was on the table in the other room?’  After the child had responded, 451 
they were taken directly back to the box and the experimenter waited to see if they would try to 452 
use the token.  The experimenter acted preoccupied for approximately 30 seconds before making 453 
eye contact with the child and giving a firm nod.  If the child used the token immediately or 454 
asked for permission to do so, we considered this to be evidence of successful transport and use, 455 
if not, they were prompted to transport and use the token.  If they made an incorrect choice, we 456 
noted whether or not they tried to use this token on the box.  All children who made an incorrect 457 
choice, or made a correct choice but did not use the token, were then given the opportunity to 458 
choose, as in the training phase, between one of the three tokens to use on the box.  This 459 
constituted the knowledge probe.  Regardless of their choices, all children were allowed to 460 
operate the box once more before the end of the experiment.   461 
 462 
QUANTIFICATION AND STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 463 
 464 
Our analyses were conducted online using vassarstats.net.  We performed one-tailed exact 465 
binomial tests to compare the number of children that performed correctly to chance on the Item 466 
Choice measure (Table 1, Figure 1) the memory question (Table 1), and the knowledge probe 467 
(Table 1). Additionally, we performed Fisher’s Exact Tests to relate performance on the memory 468 
question and spontaneous use measure with whether or not participants picked the correct token 469 
(in a 2x2 contingency table with alpha set at 0.05).  For the sake of this analysis we grouped 470 
children who picked either the associate or the novel token into the same category.   471 
 472 
DATA AVAILABILITY  473 
The data set containing individual data from experiments 1-3 is available at figshare.com. 474 
DOI: 10.6084/m9.figshare.6236645 475 
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